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Abstract – Wireless sensor networks have received wide attention recently across the indoor and
outdoor applications. On the other hand, more and more application scenarios require sensor nodes
to be mobile, which imposes new technological challenges for security. Key management is the core
for secure data communications among the resource-constrained sensor nodes. In this paper, based on
the Group Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols and the energy level of each node in the network,
we propose Energy Aware Group Diffie-Hellman key management protocol for mobile wireless sensor
networks. The simulation results show that the proposed key management protocol provide significant
improvement in maximizing the lifetime of networks.
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1 Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of a large number of battery powered
sensor nodes, equipped with sensing, data processing and short-range radio communi-
cation components [1]. WSNs have a wide range of applications, including agricultural,
industrial, military and health monitoring systems. WSNs present unique security chal-
lenges compared to wire and ad hoc networks, such as the usage of the wireless medium,
limited processing capabilities of sensor nodes and the absence of physical protection.
This situation becomes more complicated when mobility is added to the nodes. The
node mobility makes WSN applications smarter and creates new applications [2]. How-
ever, the unique characteristics of Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs) present
a new set of nontrivial challenges in terms of open network architecture, resource con-
straints and highly dynamic change of network topology [3].
In MWSNs, a particularly important challenge is the creation of an end-to-end secure
channel between remote nodes. Thus, key management is of paramount importance for
MWSNs. A number of key management schemes have been proposed in the literature
[4, 5]. However, some of them are considered suitable only for static WSNs and tend
to be application-specific, while others introduce significant storage cost and compu-
tational overhead. There is a common belief that public-key protocols are unsuitable
for sensor nodes due to the fact that the public key algorithms such as RSA are com-
putationally intensive and usually execute thousands or even millions of multiplication
instructions to perform a single-security operation [6]. However, the recent studies
have shown that the public key cryptography such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) [7] and the Rabin’s scheme [8] might be feasible in the sensor networks. One
of the most common public key protocols is the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
[9].
This paper revises and modifies Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) protocol, in order to
attain energy efficient group key management in MWSNs. To achieve this goal, we pro-
pose Energy Aware Group Diffie-Hellman (EAGDH), a key management protocol that
takes into consideration the energy level of nodes and distributes the computational
burden of key generation accordingly.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides related work
in this area as well as motivation for our work. Section 3 reviews the Group Diffie-
Hellman based key distribution. Section 4 presents our key management solution, while
in Section 5 the simulation results are analyzed. Finally, we conclude this paper with
future work in Section 6.
2 Related work, motivation and notations
2.1 Related work
Although there are numerous key management approaches (such as [10, 11, 12])
for WSNs, they cannot be applied in MWSNs, as they assume that the deployed nodes
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are stationary. Therefore, new key management approaches for MWSNs are required.
Chuang et al.[13] proposed a two-layered dynamic key management (TDKM) scheme
for mobile and long-lived cluster based wireless sensor networks. In TDKM, both
the pair-wise key and the group key are distributed in three rounds without any en-
cryption/decryption and exponential operation. Khan et al.[14] presented a runtime
key management scheme for the mobile heterogeneous sensor networks that consist
of mobile sensor nodes and a few fixed sensor ones. Blundo et al.[15] proposed the
polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme for the mobile sensor networks. Kifayat
et al.[16] proposed a group-based key management scheme which uses distinct keys on
different levels in the network, while Aileni et al.[17] examined efficient ways of key
distribution among the sensor nodes and the inter/intra-communications.
2.2 Motivation
MWSNs have the advantage over the traditional static sensor networks in that they
can deal better with changing operational conditions (e.g., node failure, battery de-
pletion of some nodes), provide better network coverage and supply more accurate
intrusion detection. Because of the mobility of nodes in the network, WMSNs can be
better applied in building fire emergency response, target tracking and dairy cattle
health monitoring. In the future ubiquitous environments each wireless sensor node
may be mobile in nature [18]. However, mobility introduces vulnerabilities to ad-
versaries [16, 19]. As nodes move from one place to another, node authentication,
communication confidentiality and data integrity must be ensured.
On the other hand, sensor nodes are constrained in energy supply and bandwidth.
Moreover, mobile entities require the additional power for mobility. Thus, new security
protocols specifically designed for MWSNs should take energy awareness as an essen-
tial consideration. Key management can be considered as a fundamental requirement
for securing sensor networks upon which other security primitives are built. A large
portion of node energy is spent on generating and distributing cryptographic keys to
the mobile nodes, especially when its join/leave rate is very high. As key management
schemes have not been designed with energy awareness in mind, they can not always
be directly applied in the energy-constrained MWSNs without firstly been reconsidered
and modified. This paper is a step towards this trend.
2.3 Notations
Table 1 shows the notations which occur in the remaining part of this paper.
3 Group Diffie-Hellman key distribution
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [20] is a widespread solution used
by the most popular cryptographic schemes. The classic DH solves the key exchange
problem between two parties communicating over an insecure communication channel.
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:54:29
UM
CS
86 Energy-aware Key Management in Mobile Wireless Sensor......
Table 1. Notations.
CH cluster head
n number of nodes (participants) in one cluster
i,j,k indices of group members (ranging in [1,n])
ei energy level of i-th node
eact
i
actual battery capacity of i-th node
bmax
i
maximum battery capacity of i-th node
Mi the i-th node of one group
Ni secret value of the i-th node
G base-point of the Elliptic Curve
q a prime number
Ci energy cost of a regular node i
nim number of multiplications executed by node i
nis number of messages sent by node i
nir number of messages received by node i
Cm cost of a single multiplication computation
Cis cost of sending one single message
Cir cost of receiving one single message
CRX reception consumption
CTX transmission consumption
tbr transmit bit rate
m mean (average) number of execution
σ standard deviation
v variation ratio
γ1 asymmetry (skewness) coefficient
γ2 excess (kurtosis) coefficient
However, it has two major disadvantages: firstly, it is relatively slow because it is
accomplished by modular exponentiations and the key in this case is relatively long;
secondly, the key exchange process is dedicated only to two parties. An extension of
DH to group setting was first studied in [21], where three variants of the Group Diffie-
Hellman (GDH) protocols were presented. The basic scheme is described in the other
part of this section.
We consider the Elliptic Curve (EC) Cryptography, as the keys in ECC are relatively
shorter for providing the same level of security [7]. All ECC parameters, other than
Ni, are assumed to be secure and known to all participants. The basic Group Diffie-
Hellman is defined as shown in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1. Elliptic-Curve-based Group Diffie-Hellman
1: Mi −→Mi+1 : {
∏j
k=1(Nk)G | j ∈ [1, i]}
2: Mn−i ←−Mn−i+1 : {
∏
k ∈[i,j](Nk)G | j ∈ [1, i]}
GDH consists of two stages: upflow (traffic flows from the group member with low
index to that with high index, as shown in the first stage of the protocol) and downflow
(the opposite of upflow, as shown in the second stage of the protocol). The protocol
needs 2(n−1)messages, i+1multiplications forMi( 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1) and n multiplications
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for Mn. In the first stage, the size of messages increases on each link, whereas it
decreases in the second stage. Furthermore, GDH does not need synchronization or
broadcasting ability.
It should be noticed that in GDH there is no a priori sequencing and numbering of
group members, which means the index of one group member (whether n-2 or n) is
assigned arbitrarily in real time, as the protocol executes.
Security of GDH protocols is related to the security of DH protocol. GDH is secure
as long as DH is secure. The protocols details (execution, security proof, performance
and other capabilities) can be found in [21].
4 Energy-aware Group Diffie-Hellman key management
4.1 Assumptions
It is assumed that the network is split into clusters based on nodes physical location
and it is composed of three types of nodes. The base station (BS) is a data requester
and serves as the gateway to the Internet. In general, BS is supplied with unlimited
energy, high computation power and sufficient storage capacity. CHs are the special
nodes which compared to the regular ones have more energy, higher computational and
processing capabilities as well as more storage capacity. Regular nodes can move from
one cluster to another, and they are responsible for sending the data sensed from the
surrounding area to the BS through CHs. There are two roles in our key management
scheme, Group Leaders (GLs) and Group Members (GMs). In one cluster, a CH serves
as a GL and all member mobile nodes serve as GMs. The proposed solution consists
in the following assumptions:
(1) The maximum distance between any two GMs in the cluster is the commu-
nication range of the sensor.
(2) A sensor node could not be recharged if its energy is exhausted.
(3) Each sensor node has an unique identifier.
(4) The communication channels are bidirectional; if a node Mi can receive a
message from node Mj , then Mi can send a message to Mj .
(5) The cost for sending and receiving one single message is the same.
(6) CHs can communicate directly with the BS.
4.2 System overview
In the GDH protocol, it can be observed that the last node (the node with the
highest index) Mn in one group plays a special role: Mn performs the largest number
of multiplications. In our network setup, we assume that CH plays the role of the
highest-indexed node Mn and there are n− 1 regular nodes in one cluster.
Our goal is to make the GDH energy aware that the maximum number of protocol ex-
ecution is guaranteed. Our purpose is to reduce energy consumption on the exhausted
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nodes (or nodes with lower energy level) by reducing the amount of computation over-
head required to compute a cryptographic key. As nodes ordering affects the protocol
execution effort on a given node, we take advantage of no a priori ordering attribute
of the GDH protocols. In our EAGDH, CH is the node with the highest-index. CH
receives the energy level of each GM and decides the index for each GM. This phase of
EAGDH is called the numbering strategy. By making use of energy factors: Cm, C
i
s
and Cir, energy consumption of EAGDH for a regular node can be expressed as:
Ci = n
i
mCm + n
i
sC
i
s + n
i
rC
i
r. (1)
The selection of the GDH protocol and the numbering strategy mainly depend on
the size of the cluster as well as those energy factors. The value of each factor is
strictly connected with hardware platforms. Some platforms can perform communica-
tion procedures (sending and receiving) in a very efficient way, while others have high
computational processing power. Table 2 presents the number of operations performed
on a regular node Mi in one cluster. The table does not include the operations of the
CH (Mn) as CH is assumed to be more resource-powerful node.
Fig. 1. Example of EAGDH execution
Table 2. Number of operations performed on a regular node in a cluster
GDH
messages sent 2, 1 for M1
messages received 2, 1 for M1
multiplications i+ 1
From Table 2 it can be observed that the least computation and communication
overheads are on the first node M1 and the computation overhead increases with the
increase of the index of each node. So, for both GDH, the best strategy is to order
nodes by increasing energy level.
An energy efficient variant of GDH is presented in Protocol 2. An execution example
of the protocol, named EAGDH, is shown in Fig. 1. The objective of EAGDH is to let
the more exhausted nodes perform fewer operations.
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Protocol 2. Energy Aware Group Diffie-Hellman
1: Each node x within a cluster sends its energy level ex with its identifier to GL.
2: E GL orders nodes in the increasing order of the energy level using a given sorting
algorithm.
3: GL assigns indices to each member corresponding to the order obtained in step 2.
4: GMs execute GDH.
5 Simulation and evaluation
In this section we evaluate the proposed scheme using two platforms: MICA2 and
Tmote Sky, on which most ECC-based security schemes are based. A typical MICA2
node is equipped with an 8-bit ATmega128L microcontroller, 4Kb of RAM, 128Kb of
Flash memory and CC1000 chip as a radio module. A Tmote Sky node is equipped with
a 16-bit MSP430 microcontroller, 10Kb of RAM, 48Kb of Flash memory, and CC2420
chip is employed as the radio module. Here, the ECC implementation presented in [22]
is employed in our simulations.
The performance results of point multiplication (multiple additions of a point) are
essential. In our simulation, we choose the most efficient case, where an EC is defined
over the prime-order field Fq. An EC point is described by 160 bits, so in our protocol
the message sizes are multiples of this value. Based on [22] and the platform datasheets,
the required costs for different operations are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Parameters for both platforms
Parameter MICA2 Tmote Sky
CRX 10.0mA 21.8mA
CTX 25.0mA 19.5mA
tbr 3.84e+ 04 bps 2.5e+ 05 bps
Cm 1.27s× 7.88mA 0.72s× 3.68mA
For both platforms, we assume that the maximum battery capacity (bmaxi ) of all
nodes is 3000 mAh. Our goal is to maximize the number of protocol executions in a
group of n nodes. We examine three cases: the worst case, during which the ordering
of nodes never changes, the mean in which the set of nodes is permuted randomly
after each execution and the optimal case in which after each execution the nodes are
renumbered in the way presented in Protocol 2. To determine the number of protocol
executions, we simulated each case (for 1000 times in mean case) under various node
densities (n) and simulation stopped when each node ran out of its battery. To explain
explicitly, we simulated the above mentioned three cases in one cluster, while others
have the same attributes as this one. The simulation outcome for the MICA2 platform
is presented in Fig. 2, while for the Tmote Sky platform in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 2. Performance of EAGDH on the MICA2 platform
Fig. 3. Performance of EAGDH on the Tmote Sky platform
For MICA2, with a small number of n, the gap (measured as the number of the
protocol executions) is about 80000 executions. With the increase of n, the gap narrows
but the relative advantage of using EAGDH is still growing.
In the case of Tmote Sky, the gap between the optimal case and the worst case is
about 300000 executions. The mean case for both platforms starts with the values near
that of the optimal one, but it approaches the worst case and for n  25 it converges
again to the optimal case. The simulation results of the mean case will be discussed in
detail and interpreted later.
Fig. 8 presents the advantages by using EAGDH on both platforms. For a given
platform, the profit is computed by dividing the number of protocol executions in the
optimal case or in the mean case by that in the worst case. The simulation results
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Fig. 4. Profits achieved on the MICA2 platform
Fig. 5. Profits achieved on the Tmote Sky platform
Table 4. Parameters of the mean case (MICA2)
n 3 8 15 25 40 50 65 80 100 140 150 180 200 250
m× 10−3 353 191 116 74 48 39 30 24 20 14 13 11 10 8
σ 99 103 81 66 55 51 41 38 33 28 27 24 23 19
v × 10−3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2 2.1 2.3 2.4
−γ1 0.79 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.73 0.84 0.66 0.79 0.96 0.71 0.82 0.54 0.73 0.65
γ2 0.41 0.29 0.49 0.75 0.49 0.93 0.58 1.50 2.93 0.55 1.12 0.34 0.9 0.61
show that both platforms (MICA2 and Tmote Sky) have almost the same rate in the
optimal case (the red line in Figs 4 and 5). In both figures, for the optimal case, the
advantages of using EAGDH increases rapidly with the increase of sensor nodes and
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Fig. 6. Histograms of simulations for MICA2
Table 5. Parameters of the mean case (Tmote Sky)
n 3 8 15 25 40 50 65 80 100 140 150 180 200 250
m× 10−3 1331 718 436 280 181 147 114 93 75 54 50 42 38 30
σ 188 189 149 130 103 94 84 71 63 55 50 46 43 40
v × 103 0.14 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.57 0.64 0.73 0.76 0.83 1 1 1.1 1.1 1.3
−γ1 0.99 0.87 0.51 0.68 0.74 0.58 0.82 0.59 0.65 0.84 0.61 0.72 0.80 0.77
γ2 1.34 2.31 0.17 0.62 1.16 0.2 1.26 0.43 0.73 1.3 0.34 0.85 0.94 0.91
converges to 2, which means that twice as many protocol executions can be achieved
by using EAGDH compared to the worst case.
We now focus on the mean case. Before analyzing the simulation results, first we
define and explain the coefficients needed in the probability density function. The
variation ratio v is defined as a measure of dispersion which can be calculated as
follows: v = σ
m
. Moreover, the skewness coefficient is set as γ1 =
μ3
σ3
, where μ3 is the
central moment of the third order. For a symmetric random variable, γ1 = 0. For
γ1 = 0, the probability density function has a long tail on the right-hand side of the
mean value (if γ1 > 0) or a long tail on the left-hand side of the mean value (if γ1 < 0).
Finally, we set γ2 =
μ4
σ4
− 3, where μ4 is the central moment of the fourth order. For
the normal distribution, the kurtosis coefficient γ2 = 0. If γ2 > 0 then, the given
probability density function is higher and its shape is slimmer around the modal value
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Fig. 7. Histograms of simulations for Tmote Sky
Fig. 8. Profits of the optimal and mean cases.
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than the density of the normal distribution. While in the case of γ2 < 0 the opposite
is observed. Further description and interpretation of these parameters for them can
be found in [23].
The results for the MICA2 platform are presented in Table 4 and Fig. 6, while the
values for Tmote Sky are in Table 5 and Fig. 7. From these tables and figures, it is
observed that the advantage of applying EAGDH over GDH on the average is remark-
able but not very high. However, higher moments of their distribution show that using
EAGDH gives essential advantages. The distribution has a long tail for short network
lifetimes, namely, the probability of short lifetimes is very high (due to skewness nega-
tive values which have relatively high absolute values). High probability of the values
in the left-hand tail is confirmed by the positive value of kurtosis (Figs 6 and 7). It
can be seen that, in order to avoid network collapses, EAGDH should be used instead
of GDH when nodes have consumed more than half of their batteries.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we proposed the Energy Aware Group Diffie-Hellman key management
protocol for mobile wireless sensor networks. By reducing computational burden on
the low energy level sensor nodes, the EAGDH protocols help extend the lifetime of a
network. The simulation results show that in the realistic communication environment
our protocol is very energy efficient.
Future work includes the security analysis of the proposed key management proto-
cols, particularly under with adversarial models, such as node capture attacks, node
replication attacks as well as reply and modification attacks. Moreover, protocol ex-
tension that handles node addition and deletion should be considered. Finally, the
establishment of a secure channel between the cluster head and the base station will
also be addressed in our next work.
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